Major Hugh Pollard, MI6 and the Spanish Civil War by Macklin, Graham
University of Huddersfield Repository
Macklin, Graham
Major Hugh Pollard, MI6 and the Spanish Civil War
Original Citation
Macklin, Graham (2006) Major Hugh Pollard, MI6 and the Spanish Civil War. The Historical 
Journal, 49 (1). pp. 277-280. ISSN 0018-246X
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/13839/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 07 Jun 2012 IP address: 161.112.232.220
COMMUNICATION
MAJOR HUGH POLLARD, MI6, AND THE
SPANISH CIVIL WAR
GRAHAM D. MACKL IN
The National Archives, Kew
The recently released Special Operations Executive (SOE) personal ﬁle of Major
Hugh Bertie Campbell Pollard (HS 9/1200/5) sheds new light on the man who
helped ﬂy General Franco from the Canary Islands toMorocco, leading ultimately
to the overthrow of the democratically elected republican government and thirty-
six years of brutal dictatorship. Contrary to the previous portrayal of Pollard, a
genial, rough-and-ready gung-ho ‘adventurer ’1 who ﬂew the future Caudillo to
Morocco on a whim, the ﬁles reveal Pollard to have been an experienced British
intelligence oﬃcer, talented linguist, and ﬁrearms expert with considerable ﬁrst-
hand experience of wars and revolutions in Mexico, Morocco, and Ireland, where
he had served as a police adviser in Dublin Castle during the ‘ stormy days ’ of the
Black and Tans in the early 1920s. Pollard, who listed his hobbies inWho’s Who as
‘hunting and shooting ’, was the sporting editor of Country Life and a member of
Lord Leconﬁeld’s hunt. He was also a renowned and passionate ﬁrearms expert
having written numerous books on the subject including the section on ‘small
arms’ for the oﬃcial war oﬃce textbook. His friend Douglas Jerrold, who himself
later served in British intelligence, recalled that Pollard ‘ looked and behaved, like
a German Crown Prince and had a habit of letting oﬀ revolvers in any oﬃce he
happened to visit ’. Once Jerrold plucked up the courage to ask Pollard if he had
ever killed anybody. ‘Never accidentally ’, he replied tartly.2
The outline of Pollard’s involvement in Franco’s ﬂight from his exile as com-
mander of the Las Palmas military garrison to Morocco where he took control of
the African army is well known and needs only be brieﬂy recounted here. On 9
July 1936, Luis Bolı´n, London correspondent for ABC, the Spanish monarchist
newspaper, followed the instructions of his Biarritz-based editor the Marque´s de
Luca Tena to lunch with Douglas Jerrold, editor of the decidedly right-wing
Catholic periodical, The English Review, at Simpson’s restaurant on the Strand.
Their discussions centred upon ﬁnding a suitable crew for the De Havilland
Dragon Rapide plane hired by Bolı´n, with funds from Spanish millionaire Juan
March, from Olley Air Services at Croydon aerodrome, then London’s main air
1 Paul Preston, Franco (London, 1993), p. 136.
2 Douglas Jerrold, Georgian adventure (London, 1937), p. 86.
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terminal.3 The plane’s pilot, former Royal Air Force oﬃcer Captain William
Henry Cecil Bebb, renowned for his skill and ‘good nerves, ’ was originally led to
believe that his cargo was a Riﬀ leader being transported to Morocco to start a
revolution, though he soon realized something more serious was afoot. In his
autobiography Bolı´n recalled asking Jerrold to ﬁnd ‘ two blondes and a trust-
worthy fellow’ who, by posing as tourists, would act as ‘cover ’ for the ﬂight’s real
purpose.4 Having decided Pollard was the ideal man for the job, not least because
of his ﬂuency in Spanish, Jerrold rang him from the restaurant and asked him if
he could be ready to ﬂy to Africa the following day with two women. ‘Depends on
the girls ’, replied Pollard dryly. Whatever his hopes Pollard had to make do with
his nineteen-year-old daughter, Diana, and her friend Dorothy Watson. Bolı´n
and Jerrold arrived at his home in Middlehurst, Sussex, later that afternoon in
order to ﬁnalize the details of the trip.5
Whether either Pollard or Jerrold alerted their contacts in British intelligence
as to the nature of the plot in which they were involved is unclear. What is clear,
however, was that the Foreign Oﬃce was aware that something was afoot.
Although Captain Bebb ﬂew Franco to Morocco on 18 July it was not until the
23rd that the British consul in Tenerife reported to his superiors the news that
Franco had ‘commandeered’ a British registered aeroplane hired by Pollard. He
had enough gumption, however, to indicate to his superiors his suspicion that
‘possibly there was some pre-arrangement ’.6 This was an understatement.
As Bebb later remembered, whilst waiting for Franco at the Las Palmas garrison,
the British consul himself arrived, ‘and passed very favourable comments on the
mission I was about to take part in. ’7
Having been successfully ﬂown to Morocco a grateful Franco later awarded
Pollard (and his fellow passengers) the Knights Cross of the Imperial Order of the
Yoke and the Arrows, a Falangist decoration, in recognition of the role they
played in his victory. His exploits also earned Pollard the appellation the ‘Spanish
pimpernel ’ from the American Life magazine.8 But Pollard’s support did not
end there. Throughout the Spanish Civil War he oﬀered unqualiﬁed apologies
for atrocities committed by Franco’s military insurgents. When the Nazi
Condor Legion levelled the symbolic Basque town of Guernica, an event since
immortalized by Picasso, Pollard wrote an indignant letter to The Times from the
comfort of his Sussex home asserting that Guernica, which he alleged was
hub of the republic’s small arms manufacture, was a ‘perfectly legitimate
target ’ particularly since it supplied arms to ‘ terrorists ’ in the British empire.
The Basques, or at least those who supported the democratic republic ‘are simply
reaping what they have sown’, scolded an unsympathetic Pollard.9
3 March was also believed to have provided a subsidy to the British Union of Fascists led by Sir
Oswald Mosley, see the National Archives (NA): KV 2/880.
4 Luis Bolı´n, Spain : the vital years (London, 1967), p. 17.
5 Jerrold, Georgian adventure, pp. 369–74; Bolı´n, Spain, pp. 16–23.
6 H. Patterson, British Consulate, to Foreign Oﬃce, 23 July 1936 in NA: FO 371/20525.
7 Guardian, 25 June 1966. 8 Life Magazine, 18 Jan. 1938. 9 Times, 3 May 1937.
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Such an attitude is hardly surprising; Pollard was a staunch Roman Catholic
who regarded it as ‘ the duty of a good Catholic to help fellow Catholics in
trouble ’. He was also a visceral anti-Communist who believed, as he put it so
eloquently in an interview with The Guardian in June 1966 the month before his
death, that Communists ‘are better put down than anything’.10 Although he
feigned a ‘gentleman’s distaste ’ for politics and claimed never to have entertained
a serious political idea in his life, Pollard was vice-chairman of his local
Conservative association, describing his precise political stance as ‘extreme
right ’.11 Right up until his death this included a strident sympathy for fascism and
Nazism, though he preferred the Fascists who marched with Mussolini rather
than the ‘ third-raters ’ that he believed were attracted to Hitler’s standard.12
Indeed, such were his pro-Nazi sympathies that Pollard narrowly escaped arrest
when the British government ordered the mass internment of British fascists in
June 1940. In December 1939 West Sussex police raided the Kent ﬂat of Mrs
Dacre-Fox, an ‘active and industrious ’ fascist whom MI5 suspected of being a
conduit of funds to Sir Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (BUF) from
Nazi Germany. During the search of her premises they discovered Pollard’s
name, and that of his daughter, in her address book.13 Armed with this evidence,
such as it was, of a connection between Pollard and the BUF, MI5 were poised to
request Pollard’s arrest were it not for one crucial fact : Pollard was a member of
their sister security agency, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), more commonly
known as MI6. His Who’s Who entry innocently indicates that during this period
Pollard was employed on the War Oﬃce General Staﬀ List, however. Upon
learning that Pollard was an SIS agent MI5 ordered their regional liaison oﬃcer
in Kent to ‘ lay oﬀ’ Pollard.14
Indeed, despite full knowledge of these political sympathies MI6 had appointed
Pollard head of its semi-autonomous ‘Section D’ in Madrid on 31 January
1940. Section D was oﬃcially a sub-division of MI6 with a remit to engage
in clandestine sabotage across Europe: in oﬃce parlance ‘D’ stood for
‘Destruction. ’15 During May 1940 Section D had what is described in the Special
Operations Executive (SOE) in-house history as, ‘one small ﬂirtation ’ with the
idea of backing the monarchist (not republican) opposition in Spain as part of the
British government’s overarching strategy to keep the country out of the war. The
plan was soon abandoned, however, once it was realized that it had absolutely no
chance of success.16 It was Pollard, operating under the codename ‘Don, ’ who
was the MI6 oﬃcer at the forefront of this initiative, an initiative planned
incidentally in conjunction with Sir Percy Loraine, the British ambassador to
10 Guardian, 25 June 1966. 11 Note of interview, 23 Feb. 1940, in NA: HS 9/1200/5.
12 Guardian, 25 June 1966.
13 Captain C. Grassby to Mrs Archer, 17 June 1940, in NA: HS 9/1200/5.
14 [Illegible signature] to Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine Vivian, 23 June 1940, in NA: HS 9/1200/5.
15 Nigel West, Secret war : the story of SOE Britain’s wartime sabotage organisation (London, 1992), p. 10.
16 William Mackenzie, The secret history of SOE: the Special Operations Executive, 1940–1945 (London,
2000), p. 32.
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Rome and Captain Alan Hillgarth, the British naval attache´ in Madrid who,
working closely with MI6, later organized the covert activities of the SOE in
Spain whilst simultaneously serving as an unoﬃcial intelligence adviser to the
prime minister Winston Churchill.17 Hillgarth had also been an indispensable
aide to the new British ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare, himself an experienced
intelligence oﬃcer who had been the head of the MI6 station in Russia until 1917.
Hoare arrived to take over a Madrid embassy mired in defeatist opinion. On the
day of his arrival Hillgarth counselled Hoare that : ‘as it is Spain with whom we
have to deal and the Spanish viewpoint is very much inﬂuenced by German and
Italian propaganda, our belief in ourselves, which must betray itself in our words
is of supreme importance’.18
Indulging themselves in a bizarre ﬂight of fantasy Pollard’s superiors seemed to
have seriously entertained the notion of allowing him to approach his ‘ friend’
General Franco and persuade him not only to accept the restoration of King
Alfonso XIII to the throne, but to ‘welcome’ it. The net eﬀect of this move, hoped
Section D, would be to remove German and Italian inﬂuence from Franco’s
regime. The basic ﬂaw in this plan, which senior Section D oﬃcers appear to
have completely failed to appreciate, was that, not only was Franco more
than comfortable with this inﬂuence, he actively courted it. Further proof of the
unrealistic premise of this plan was signiﬁed by the involvement of Pollard himself
whose participation, noted the anonymous author of a memo found in Pollard’s
ﬁle, ‘ scared me a great deal ’. Such fears were entirely justiﬁed. Not only was
Pollard considered out-of-touch by other senior Section D oﬃcers, but he
was renowned as a ‘dyed-in-the-wool ’ Franco supporter, and thus unlikely do
anything to undermine the position of a man he so greatly admired.19
More importantly his superiors considered that whilst there were ‘certain jobs ’
at which Pollard could ‘do well ’ these skills were overshadowed by his reputation
for being at best ‘most indiscreet ’ and, when combined with money and drink,
‘deﬁnitely unreliable. ’ His further involvement in the plan was therefore deemed
‘ fatal ’. Such a dismal view of his character no doubt presaged Pollard’s fall from
grace. Before the year was out the question of his return and dismissal was tabled
as a matter for ‘urgent consideration. ’20 The same month Section D dispensed
with Pollard’s services, Winston Churchill ordered the formation of the Special
Operations Executive (SOE), a clandestine organization that would ‘set Europe
ablaze ’ through covert action. Section D oﬃcially disbanded on 21 October 1940
and was re-titled SO2, which was subsequently absorbed into SOE.21 Pollard died
in March 1966 aged seventy-eight, an unrepentant supporter of the brutal
Francoist regime, which he had played a crucial part in helping to install.
17 David Staﬀord, Churchill and the secret service (London, 1997), p. 209.
18 J. A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare : a political biography (London, 1977), p. 331.
19 Memo re meetings with D on 4, 5, and 7 May 1940 in NA: HS 6/942.
20 Colonel W. F. Jeﬀries to [no signature], 12 July 1940 in NA: HS 9/1200/5.
21 D/A to all oﬃcers, secretaries, subsections and stations, 21 October 1940 in TNA: HS 8/334.
I would like to thank Chris Murphy for bringing this reference to my attention.
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